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Abstract Since 1944, United States financing of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has been appropriated and approved in Congress by roll-call vote. If voting to
increase funds to the IMF is viewed as an observable signal of “support” for the
IMF, these votes provide a historical record of legislative support for the IMF in the
United States. I analyze roll-call voting on IMF financing from 1944 to 2009 at both
the aggregate (congressional) and the micro (legislator) levels. At the aggregate
level, I show that support for the IMF has fallen over time in the House of
Representatives but not in the Senate. In the micro-analysis, I use a “natural
experiment” to establish that this intercameral difference is the result of the Senate’s
larger and more heterogeneous constituencies, as opposed to other modeled and
unmodeled factors. I also find that legislator support for the IMF is shaped strongly
by ideology: regardless of chamber, left-wing legislators are as much as 31
percentage points more likely to support the IMF than right-wing legislators. Yet
controlling for ideology, senators are more likely to support the IMF than
representatives, and representatives are more sensitive to constituency pressures
than senators. I attribute these differences to chamber-specific rules governing the
size of constituencies.
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1 Introduction
When Congress authorized United States participation in the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in 1944, it retained the “power of the purse” indefinitely, meaning that
any subsequent increase in U.S. financing for the IMF would require congressional
authorization and appropriation. Over the years, the IMF has requested more
resources from the United States (and other member nations), to accommodate
growth in the world economy and to meet crisis needs for balance of payments
financing. In each instance, both houses of Congress considered and authorized the
funding increases. These IMF funding authorizations, and the roll-call votes that
accompanied them, are the focus of this paper.
From a social science standpoint, congressional roll-call of voting on IMF
financing is important because it provides an observable record of individual and
aggregate support for the IMF within the United States. When an individual
legislator votes in favor of increasing U.S. funding of the IMF, it signals the
lawmaker’s approval of the IMF and its mission—loosening the purse strings is
equivalent to a vote of support for the IMF.1 Likewise, when financing bills are
passed by large majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate, it sends
the message that aggregate political support for the IMF is high in the United States.
By contrast, when legislators vote against IMF financing, individually or as a
majority, it signals opposition to the IMF and its practices. In short, congressional
financing decisions convey information about legislative support and opposition to
the IMF in the United States, the nation that is the largest contributor to the IMF and
its most powerful member.
I motivate my “micro” analysis of legislator voting on the IMF with a survey of
aggregate legislative support for the IMF over time (where aggregate support is
measured as the share of all legislators voting in favor for new IMF funding
commitments). These time series reveal a stark difference across the chambers of
Congress: while aggregate support for the IMF was initially high in both the House
and the Senate, support has fallen steadily in the House but not the Senate.
Explaining this intercameral difference is one of the goals of this paper.
The heart of the paper is a micro-analysis of individual voting decisions by
legislators. An innovation over previous work is that I have assembled roll-call
voting data back to the IMF’s founding in 1944 (Broz 2008; Broz and Hawes 2006a,
b). In addition, I have roll-call votes from both houses of Congress over this period.
The longer panel dataset allows me to examine how support for the IMF has
changed over time; the roll-calls from both chambers of Congress allow me to see
how institutional differences across the chambers affects legislator voting.
Building on previous work, I show that legislator “ideology” is the most important
influence on how legislators view the IMF, both over time and across chambers.
Controlling for other factors and including roll-call fixed effects, I find that moving a
1 Legislators’ votes might not be straightforward manifestations of preferences in the presence of party
pressure, executive influence, or vote-buying and logrolling. In the statistical analysis, I control for some
of the factors that intervene between legislators’ preferences and their roll call votes.
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Republican legislator one standard deviation to the “right” reduces her likelihood of
voting in support of the IMF by 31 percentage points.2 Moving a Democrat to the right
by the same increment lowers her odds of supporting the IMF by 24 percentage points.
This supports the argument that legislators use ideology as a simple schema for
determining positions on the IMF and its operations. Right-wing politicians tend to
oppose the IMF because they see it as providing “bailouts” that insulate international
investors and foreign borrowers from the risks of their actions. By contrast, left-leaning
politicians tend to focus on market failures and see a positive role for the IMF in
mitigating crises that result from imperfections in international financial markets. My
results show that a left-leaning ideological position is an important source of legislator
support for the IMF, going all the way back to the founding of the institution.
I also find micro-level evidence that senators are more supportive of the IMF
than representatives. Controlling for political party and roll-call fixed effects,
Senate Democrats are 10 percentage points more likely than House Democrats to
support the IMF, and Senate Republicans are 17 percentage points more likely
than House Republicans to favor the IMF. I attribute this to the Senate’s large,
statewide constituencies that encompass more cross-cutting groups and interests
than House congressional districts. Larger constituencies lead the Senate to be
more supportive of the IMF than the House, just as the Senate is more supportive
of free trade than the House. My best evidence is drawn from a “natural
experiment” that takes advantage of the fact that certain senators and
representatives have identical constituencies. Due to their small populations,
states such as Vermont, Delaware, South Dakota and Wyoming are apportioned
just one “Representative-at-Large” to represent the entire state. To test whether
larger constituencies increase support for the IMF, I compare the votes cast by
representatives-at-large with the votes of senators from these same states. I find
that representatives’ votes on the IMF are not statistically different than the votes
of senators when they have identical constituencies. This result holds when I
control for the time until the next election, which is one of the important
differences between the House and Senate. When senators register more support
for the IMF than representatives, it is because they have larger and more diverse
constituencies, rather than because they face election less frequently than
representatives.
I also test the related institutional hypothesis that the House is more susceptible to
pressures from constituent groups and special interests than the Senate. I find
evidence that receiving more campaign contributions from money center banks,
having more skilled “pro-globalization” workers in a district, and having more
workers employed in export industries increase the likelihood that a representative
will vote to approve new financing for the IMF. By contrast, having more workers
employed in import-competing industries reduces the likelihood a representative will
vote to approve money for the IMF. None of these constituency and special interest
influences holds for senators, however. I find that senators are better insulated, due
to their large districts, from the societal pressures that House members face when
voting on the IMF.
2 My measure of legislator ideology is from Poole and Rosenthal (1997), who use spatial modeling to map
legislator positions on a dominate left-right dimension.
The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009 343
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 2, I describe the relationship
between Congress and the IMF and the congressional procedures for ratifying IMF
requests for more resources. I provide information on all IMF funding increases to
come before Congress since 1944 and the associated congressional roll-call votes on
these allocations. Section 3 contains the aggregate analysis of congressional support
for the IMF, along with conjectures about the institutional sources of intercameral
differences in IMF support. In Section 4, I develop and test these arguments with
micro-level voting data from Congress. Section 5 provides a summary and the
implications of my research.
2 Congress and IMF Funding Increases
The basic terms of U.S. participation in the IMF have not changed
substantively from the original law: the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of
1944 (Public Law 171, 79th Congress). Congress delegated some important
functions to the Executive Branch: the President appoints the U.S. Executive
Director to the IMF, and the Executive Director is ordered by law to clear his
or her decisions with the Secretary of the Treasury. But Congress retained final
authority over certain IMF policy areas, including funding increases. Table 1
identifies the key IMF policy areas and indicates whether congressional action is
required by U.S. law in each area. Quota increases for the United States, as well as
supplemental loans to the IMF via the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB)
Table 1 U.S. congressional action needed on various IMF options
Option Congressional action
Quota increase for the United
States
Requires congressional authorization and appropriation.
Loans to the IMF through the
GAB and NAB
Requires congressional authorization and appropriation.
Sale of IMF gold Requires congressional authorization under most circumstances.




Requires congressional authorization (because it amends the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement).a
New allocation of SDRs Not required if the total amount of SDRs allocated to the United States
is smaller than the current U.S. quota in the Fund.
Reorganize Executive Board No authorization or appropriation required under most circumstances.
However, if Board reform is done through an amendment of the
Articles, congressional authorization is required.a
Ad-hoc quota increase for
select countries
None required (even though this may lower the U.S. voting share).
Revise quota formula No congressional authorization or appropriation required.
a The Bretton Woods Agreements Act requires that Congress give its assent before the United States may
vote for any amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement. This table is adapted from Sanford and Weiss
(2009, Table 3)
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and the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), require congressional authorization
and appropriation.
“Quotas” are the capital subscriptions that member governments make to the IMF.
Quotas serve as the IMF’s main resource for international stabilization activities and
also determine member governments’ voting power—vote shares in the IMF are tied
to contributions. Quotas can be increased for all members under a “General Review
of Quotas,” which must be conducted at least every 5 years.3 If a General Review
results in the approval of a quota increase, Congress must ratify the U.S. increase.
Table 2 provides a summary of all General Quota Reviews since the founding of the
IMF. As indicted in Column 3, General Reviews have produced eight major quota
increases since 1944. In each instance, Congress was required to approve the
increase in the U.S. quota.
While quotas are its main source of financing, the IMF supplements its resources
during emergencies by borrowing directly from the United States (and other
industrial countries) through the GAB and the NAB. The flexibility and importance
of supplemental borrowing was made evident during the recent “subprime” global
financial crisis. On April 2, 2009, members of the G-20 agreed to increase the NAB
by up to $500 billion to combat the crisis. The United States committed to a $100
billion increase to the NAB and the overall agreement was ratified by the Executive
Board of the IMF on April 12, 2010. Given U.S. law, President Obama needed to
secure Congressional approval for two actions: the increase of $100 billion for U.S.
participation in the expanded NAB, and an increase of $8 billion in the U.S. quota
needed to implement the April 2008 IMF quota reform package. This proved to be
difficult due to opposition from what the Wall Street Journal called “an unlikely
coalition of Republicans, left-wing Democrats and anti-globalization activists”
(Davis and Hitt 2009, A10).
I exploit the feature of American law that requires all increases in U.S. quotas and
loans to the IMF to be approved by Congress. I assume that voting to authorize more
resources for the IMF is signal of support for the IMF since providing more
resources to the IMF allows it to engage in more international financial operations.4
Hence, congressional voting provides an opportunity for understanding patterns of
support and opposition to the IMF within the United States.
Table 3 provides summary information on the roll-call votes analyzed in this
paper. The sample is limited in several ways. First, I include only votes where the
IMF funding allocation is the sole or primary content, which is to say that I do not
include votes on omnibus spending bills that bundle IMF funding with various
unrelated expenditures.5 For example, Senate vote #126 in the 98th Congress (1983–84)
3 Article III, Section 2(a) of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement provides that “the Board of Governors shall
at intervals of not more than 5 years conduct a general review, and if it deems it appropriate propose an
adjustment, of quotas of members.”
4 In the presence of logrolling, legislators’ positions on the IMF would be hard to discern from their voting
behavior. Suppose legislator A votes in favor of an IMF funding bill that she mildly opposes but that is
strongly favored by legislator B. In exchange, legislator B votes for a farm allocation that he mildly
opposes, but that is strongly favored by legislator A. In this instance, A’s vote for the IMF does not
accurately convey her mild opposition to the institution.
5 Vote data were obtained and cross-checked from two sources: Voteview (http://voteview.com/) and
Thomas (http://thomas.loc.gov). When these sources did not agree on the content of a vote, further
information was obtained from the Congressional Record (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/index.html).
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was to pass S.695, the International Recovery and Financial Stability Act. While this
Act included a quota increase for the IMF and new money for the GAB, it also
addressed the Export–import Bank, the supervision of international banking activities,
multilateral development banks, and several other areas. It would be misleading to infer
that votes on this omnibus measure indicate support or opposition to the IMF since
other programs were addressed as well. Thus, I restrict the sample to votes that focus
exclusively on the IMF allocation; “clean” votes that capture legislator positions on the
IMF and little else.
This restriction means that some IMF funding increases are not included in the
analysis, or that clean votes are available for only one chamber of Congress. To help
address this problem, I extend the sample to include votes on amendments to
omnibus expenditure bills that specifically target the IMF allocation. Existing
research shows that congressional voting on amendments is similar to voting on final
passage, in terms of the influence of political party, personal ideology, and other
dominant factors (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). I therefore include amendments to
omnibus bills that exclusively target funding for the IMF. For example, the $108
billion increase for the NAB in 2009 was bundled into a supplemental appropriations
bill that included financing for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other things,
Table 2 IMF general quota reviews









U.S. share of total
quotas (percent)
Founding Subscription 1944 100 1948 2.750 32.5
First Quinquennial 1950 No increase 1950 2.750 32.0
Second Quinquennial 1955 No increase 1955 2.750 29.6
1958/59 1959 60.7 1959 4.125 28.4
Third Quinquennial 1960 No increase 1960 4.125 27.0
Fourth Quinquennial 1965 30.7 1966 5.160 24.3
Fifth General 1970 35.4 1970 6.700 23.1
Sixth General 1976 33.6 1978 8.405 22.5
Seventh General 1978 50.9 1980 12.608 21.2
Eighth General 1983 47.5 1983 17.918 20.2
Ninth General 1990 50 1992 26.527 18.8
Tenth General 1995 No increase 1995 26.527 18.3
Eleventh General 1998 45 1999 37.149 17.7
Twelfth General 2003 No increase 2003 37.149 17.5
Thirteenth General 2008 No increase 2008 37.149 17.1
Fourteenth General ongoing – – – –
The IMF conducts general quota reviews about every 5 years. Quota increases comprise an equipropor-
tional percentage increase for all members and a selective increase, which adjusts certain members’ quota
shares in order to align them with their relative economic size. Column 3 is the sum of the
equiproportional increase and the selective increases. The 1958/59 review was the only review conducted
outside the 5-year cycle. Data on quota and quota shares are from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS)
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as well as for the IMF. However, on May 21, 2009 the Senate voted on an
amendment that isolated the IMF allocation. The amendment, proposed by right-
wing Jim DeMint (Rep-SC)—an opponent of the IMF increase—would strip IMF
funding from the supplemental appropriations bill. The amendment failed by a vote
of 30–64 and the IMF got its money. By voting against the amendment, senators
indicated they supported extending the IMF an additional $100 billion credit via the
NAB and supported increasing the U.S. quota by $8 billion. The vote on the DeMint
amendment is “clean” and therefore included in the analysis.
3 Aggregate Support for the IMF in the House and Senate
I begin the analysis with an aggregate indicator of congressional support for the
IMF: the size of the margin voting in favor of IMF funding by chamber. When a
chamber approves IMF funding increases by wide margins, it stands to reason that
the IMF commands a high level of support in that chamber. By contrast, when
funding increases are approved by narrow margins—or fail to be approved
altogether—it signals that the chamber views the IMF less favorably. While factors
other than legislators’ native “support” for the IMF shape the size of these margins—
international crises, conflicting spending priorities, budget conditions, etc.—vote
margins provide a rough gauge of aggregate congressional support for the IMF, both
over time and across houses of Congress.
I expect that the level of aggregate support the IMF enjoys in Congress is
likely to differ systematically between chambers, due to differences in electoral
institutions across the chambers. The U.S. has a bicameral legislature consisting
of an upper house–the Senate–and a lower house–the House of Representatives.
The 435 members of the House of Representatives serve 2-year terms and
represent small districts, apportioned by population, while the 100 senators serve
6-year terms and represent entire states. Existing research suggests that support
for the IMF should be higher in the Senate than in the House, due to senators’
larger constituencies. Having large districts means that senators represent
heterogeneous constituencies; thus, cross-cutting pressures from interests within
their districts should make them relatively less sensitive to anti-globalization and
anti-IMF pressures than representatives. This “constituency size” argument is
commonplace in the literature on trade policy (Baldwin 1985; Rogowski 1987;
Magee et al. 1989; Keech and Pak 1995; Bailey et al. 1997; Gilligan 1997; Irwin
and Kroszner 1999). In his classic paper, Rogowski (1987, 208) argues that it is
“almost self-evident” that large districts offer insulation from particularistic
pressures and therefore a more internationalist outlook. Similarly, Baldwin
(1985, 16) asserts that “Since senators generally represent more populous and
industrially diversified political units than House members, it is less likely that
the proportion of workers employed in import injured industries will be so high
that a senator is forced to adopt a protectionist posture.” This argument can be
extended to support for the IMF since the IMF is the international financial
institution charged with promoting trade and global economic integration. Just as
the Senate is more free trading than the House, so too should it be more
supportive of the IMF.
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Figure 1 indicates that the level of support for the IMF is higher in the Senate than
in the House. The vertical axis displays the share of the chamber voting in favor of
new appropriations for the IMF; the year the vote occurred is shown on the
horizontal axis. The figure reveals that aggregate support for the IMF has fallen
steadily over time in the House but not in the Senate. In 1945, 95% of House
members registered support for the vote to fund and authorize initial U.S.
participation in the IMF. By 1998, only 46% of House members could muster
support for the IMF on the clean vote identified in Table 3. This roll call took place
on April 23, 1998, during the height of the Asian currency crisis when the IMF was
desperate to increase its resources to deal with the spreading crisis. But the failure of
the House to approve this procedural motion—which would have allowed the House
and Senate to pass identical spending bills and thereby provide the IMF with $18
billion—stalled the IMF appropriation for another 6 months. The subsequent spread
of the crisis to Russia and Brazil, along with President Clinton’s admonishment of
congressional foot-dragging as “irresponsible,” ultimately helped convince House
opponents that they would be blamed if a global recession took place (Frankel and
Roubini 2003, 187). But it was not until October, 1998 that the House finally
approved the IMF’s $18 billion (in an omnibus supplemental spending package), and
many House conservatives were still deeply skeptical about the funding increase.
The decline in House support for the IMF may reflect increasing anti-
globalization sentiment during the post-war period. With small districts, representa-
tives may have been more exposed to interest group and constituency pressures
associated with increasing international economic integration. The IMF is the
international institution charged with protecting world trade and payments from
financial distress; it is a natural target for constituencies harmed by deepening global
economic integration (Woods 2006).
One conjecture is that support for the IMF was high in the House in the early
post-war period because few congressional districts faced serious import competition
at that time. The war’s destruction of the capital stock of the other major industrial
countries and the disintegration of goods markets had left the United States running
large trade surpluses: from 1945 to 1955, the U.S. trade surplus averaged an
impressive 1.76% of GDP per year.6 By the early 1970s, the boom for the tradables
sector was over as post-war recovery and rapid economic growth in Europe and
Japan led to surging imports and the onset of persistent U.S. trade deficits. Since
1975, the nation imported more goods and services than it exported and the trade
deficit has averaged −2.05% of GDP between 1975 and 2009. Large trade deficits,
along with falling transportation costs and reduced barriers to trade, meant that more
U.S. workers and firms were exposed to foreign competition—both at home and in
world markets—than before. As a result, anti-globalization pressures intensified and
were reflected in the House of Representatives (Destler 2005). It’s possible that
opposition to globalization spilled over to the IMF and reduced representatives’
support for new funding increases.
Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence. The figure plots the correlation between
support for the IMF in the House and the U.S. trade balance. The trade balance fits
the data well (R2=0.72) and the correlation is highly significant (t=4.84). While
6 Trade balance data are from Historical Statistics of the United States (2010).
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other factors may correlate with support for the IMF in the House, the trade balance
seems potentially important. Global competition, as well as import surges caused by
U.S. macroeconomic policies—e.g., the “strong dollar” policy of the first Reagan
administration—correlate strongly with the decline in IMF support among
representatives.
Aggregate support for the IMF in the Senate, however, does not fit this pattern.
Figure 1 suggests that support in the upper chamber has been higher than in the
House for all votes except the first one in 1945. Furthermore, Senate support is
unrelated to the trade balance: the correlation is positive but not significant (t=1.02,
P=0.349).
Greater support for the IMF in the Senate might be expected, given differences in
electoral institutions. With their statewide constituencies, senators may be more
insulated from anti-globalization pressures and thereby more able than representa-
tives to take an internationalist outlook on the IMF, as they do on other foreign
policy issues (Meernik and Oldmixon 2004; Cronin and Fordham 1999). If senators
represent more populous and industrially diversified political units than House
members, it is less likely that the proportion of workers and firms that are negatively
affected by import competition will be so high that a senator is forced to adopt an
anti-IMF posture. I explore this hypothesis in the micro-level analysis below.
Note that the “constituency size” argument also extends to the office of the
president. With a nationwide constituency, presidents have been consistently less
protectionist than Congresses (Baldwin 1985; Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994;
Milner and Rosendorff 1996). According to Karol (2007, 486), “Since 1932 all
presidents have indeed been more supportive of freer trade than the Congresses with
which they served.” Presidents have also consistently supported the IMF more
strongly than the Congresses with which they served. In fact, every IMF quota
increase has been supported by the president despite partisan and ideological
differences across presidents. A good example of this occurred in 1983 when
aggregate Senate support for IMF funding ebbed to its lowest level (63%). The
context was the IMF’s Eighth General Quota Review, which coincided with the
Latin American debt crisis. The debt crisis aroused strong ideological divisions in
Congress over IMF funding (Boughton 2001, 867–70). The Eighth Review quota
increase proposal was attacked by left-of-center legislators who saw it as a bailout
Fig. 1 Aggregate support for
IMF financing by chamber,
1945–2009. Notes: Observations
correspond to the roll-call
votes on IMF funding listed
in Table 3
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for commercial banks that had lent imprudently to developing countries. Conversely,
right-of-center politicians attacked the IMF quota increase as a bailout for indebted
countries with excessive governmental intervention in their economies (Boughton
2001, 869). The ideological opposition delayed the appropriation, which led the IMF
to impose a partial freeze on new lending (Bordo and James 2000, 32). The threat to
the global banking system and U.S. national interests spurred President Ronald
Reagan to undertake a strong personal campaign to elicit support for the
appropriation. Despite his right-wing ideology, Reagan said he had “an unbreakable
commitment to increased funding for the IMF” and referred to the Fund as the
“linchpin of the international financial system.” Reagan urged Congress to back the
large quota increase to prevent an “economic nightmare that could plague
generations to come” (Farnsworth 1983, 1).
While “ideology” has relatively less influence on presidential support for the IMF,
it is an important source of congressional attitudes toward the IMF.7 As I have
argued elsewhere, ideology provides legislators with a simple schema for evaluating
policy towards the IMF, which they tend to know little about (Broz and Hawes
2006a, b). Nearly all issues and votes in Congress fall along the “left-right”
dimension epitomized by the role of government in the economy (Poole and
Rosenthal 1997). Funding the IMF is no different (Locke 2000). Right-wing
politicians that believe in a small role for government in the domestic economy
oppose the IMF because they think IMF programs distort economic incentives in the
global economy. They view IMF programs as “bailouts” that insulate investors and
borrowers from the risks of their actions and thereby promote greater instability in
international finance. The right also opposes expansion of the government sector and
they see international organizations like the IMF as particularly prone to waste and
inefficiency.8 Conversely, the left focuses on market failures at both the domestic
and the international levels and sees a positive role for IFIs in mitigating the
economic and social costs of financial and development crises. The left also tends to
be more optimistic about the operations of international organizations, and the
motivations of the officials that inhabit them.9 In short, ideology provides the
foundation upon which legislators evaluate the IMF.
The ideological divide on the IMF widened in 1983 when the Latin American
debt crisis starkly illustrated the moral hazard problem (Smith 1984). It became
wider still during the Asian currency crises when the Clinton administration
approached Congress for increasing the resources of the IMF by $18 billion (Locke
2000). By that point, the proposal was immediately and forcefully opposed by
House conservatives. After a long battle, the final appropriations bill passed with a
proviso that a special bipartisan commission be established to consider the future of
the IMF and the other international financial institutions. The Meltzer Commission,
7 While both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were initially susceptible to right-wing arguments
against the IMF, once in office, they both supported new IMF funding proposals. See Smith (1984) and
Babb (2008).
8 See, for example, Dick Armey (Rep, TX), “The Moral Hazard of IMF Expansion.” Remarks prepared
for delivery on the House Floor, October 2, 1998. http://www.imfsite.org/finprograms/hazard.html
9 See, for example, John J. LaFalce (Dem, NY), “The Role of the United States and the IMF in the Asian
Financial Crisis,” Address before the Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, January 27,
1998. http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=301
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named for its chair, economics professor Allan Meltzer, produced a report in
November 1998 that encapsulates the tension between the right-wing and the left-
wing views of the IMF.10 While the right-wing majority on the commission
emphasized how IMF programs created a moral hazard for international banks and
borrowing countries alike, left-wing dissenters argued that the IMF has a necessary
and important place in the world economy, due to market failures in international
finance.
Spatial scaling techniques developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) are well
established tools for estimating the ideological positions of legislators and
legislatures over time (Poole 2005). The DW-NOMINATE methodology yields
estimates of each member’s ideal point in each Congress and allows the estimated
locations to be compared across Congresses. Previous research has demonstrated
that the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE locations reveal standard left-right
cleavages (Poole and Rosenthal 2007).11 To investigate whether “ideology” might
help explain why the Senate tends to be more supportive of the IMF than the House,
Figure 3 plots the average value of the first dimension DW-NOMINATE for each
house of Congress from the 79th Congress (1945–46) to the 110th Congress (2007–
08). I am interested in the difference in the average ideology of the Senate and the
House because, if ideology accounts for the higher level of support for the IMF in
the upper chamber, then the Senate should be systematically more left-wing than the
House. The figure does not support this conjecture as there is no clear left-wing bias
in the Senate. A comparison of means test confirms that the small difference (0.004)
10 See also Meltzer (2011).
11 Because Poole and Rosenthal construct their estimates using only roll call data, DW-NOMINATE
conflates two sources of legislator ideology: constituency characteristics and the personal beliefs of
members. Constituents shape legislator ideology by electing members with similar beliefs—right-wing
electorates tend to elect legislators who occupy right-wing positions in the NOMINATE space. Thus, DW-
NOMINATE incorporates both constituency and personal ideological beliefs. See Fleck and Kilby (2002)
and Fordham and McKeown (2003).
Fig. 2 U.S. trade balance and
support for the IMF in
the house of representatives.
Notes: The source for the trade
balance data is Historical
Statistics of the United States:
Millennial Edition Online (2010)
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in average ideology between the House x ¼ 0:014ð Þ and the Senate x ¼ 0:018ð Þ
is not statistically significant (t=0.653). Average ideology does not appear to explain
why the Senate is more supportive of the IMF than the House.
This preliminary investigation has revealed that average support for the IMF is
higher in the Senate than in the House, and that House support has declined in
correlation with the trade balance. While there is little evidence that ideological
differences across chambers “explain” these intercameral differences, we cannot rule
out the possibility that electoral institutions are at work. The evidence presented is
consistent with the “constituency size” argument: with larger and more heteroge-
neous constituencies, senators are inclined to take a more internationalist (pro-IMF)
outlook than representatives. With large populations, states encompass a wider
variety of groups and interests than do congressional districts (which are sometimes
gerrymandered to produce a single interest or dominant partisan predisposition). Due
to their diverse and cross-cutting constituencies, senators might also be more
insulated from the parochial pressures that representatives face during periods of
high import penetration.
The aggregate evidence is merely suggestive. To evaluate these claims with
greater rigor, I move to the micro-analysis of legislator voting behavior.
4 Micro-level Analysis of Legislator Support for the IMF
In this section, I analyze the individual voting decisions of senators and
representatives on the sample of “clean” IMF funding bills to come before Congress
since 1944. The aim is to build on the arguments and conclusions from the previous
section, which can be restated at the micro-level:
1. The more left-wing the ideology of the individual legislator, the more likely the
legislator is to vote in support of a new appropriation for the IMF.
2. Controlling for ideology and party affiliation, senators are more likely than
representatives to vote for a new IMF appropriation due to their larger
constituencies.
3. Representatives are more sensitive to constituency pressures than senators on
matters relating to IMF financing.
The first argument reflects the fact that ideology structures almost all roll-call
voting in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), including votes on the IMF (Broz
and Hawes 2006a, b). The second hypothesis captures the argument that
intercameral differences in the size of constituencies give senators a more
internationalist outlook on IMF policy than representatives. The third hypothesis
tests the claim that, due to their smaller districts, House members are more
susceptible to pressures from constituents and special interests that are affected,
directly or indirectly, by the IMF’s international financial activities.
With respect to interest groups that are directly affected by the IMF’s activities, I
focus on “money center” banks. Money center banks are the nation’s largest global
banks. They engage in international finance and have a heavy involvement in
wholesale banking with clients comprising many retail banks and global corpo-
rations. Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America fit this description.
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Money center banks comprise a key constituency for the IMF. On the one hand, IMF
financial rescues provide de facto insurance to these banks, allowing them to retain
the gains from international lending while distributing losses, when they occur, to
the public sector. IMF rescues are a form of insurance to these private creditors, and
thus a source of moral hazard (Bulow and Rogoff 1990; Rogoff 1999). Indeed, Bird
(1996) finds that the financial assistance the Fund provides to debtor countries is
often used to repay loans to commercial banks. In some instances, debt service is an
explicit component of IMF programs (Gould 2003).12 Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(1993) also find general evidence of the benefits moral hazard provides to banks by
showing that unanticipated increases in U.S. financial commitments to the IMF
cause the stock market capitalization of the exposed banks to increase. On the other
hand, the operations of the IMF expand international opportunities for money center
banks and promote policies in developing countries that are conducive to debt
repayment. Thus, I expect campaign contributions from money center banks to have
a positive impact on the propensity of representatives to vote in favor of increasing
U.S. contributions to the IMF.
With respect to constituents that are indirectly affected by the IMF’s activities,
I expect House members representing districts with greater proportions of net
“losers” from economic globalization to be more likely to oppose increasing the
IMF’s resources. This is because the IMF, by pursuing its mandate to promote
the expansion, integration, and stability of the global economy, encourages
globalization and its attendant domestic distributional consequences (Woods
2006; Moser and Sturm 2011).
Two models from trade theory identify the losers and winners of the IMF’s
pro-globalization policies: the Ricardo-Viner model and the Stolper-Samuelson
model. My extension to IMF funding recognizes that the IMF’s mandate to
protect the world economy from financial disorder is a benefit to constituencies
that gain from global economic integration and a cost to groups that suffer. From
the Ricardo-Viner perspective, I thus expect House members with higher shares
of constituents employed in export industries to be more receptive to IMF
funding increases than members with large numbers of workers employed in
import-competing industries. From the Stolper-Samuelson perspective, I expect
members representing districts with greater proportions of high-skilled workers to
support IFI funding increases, while representatives with greater shares of low-
skilled workers in their districts will oppose these appropriations.
4.1 Data, Models, and Results
The dependent variable in the following regressions is the legislator’s vote on IMF
funding increases. The roll-calls included in these analyzes are listed in Table 3.
Votes are coded 1=“support” for the IMF funding increase, and 0=opposition to the
appropriation.13 The data are in panel format with the legislator-vote as the unit of
12 Oatley and Yackee (2004) find that countries in which U.S. money center banks are more heavily
exposed are more likely to receive support from the IMF, controlling for other correlates.
13 On the four roll calls where a “nay” vote supports the IMF appropriation, “nay”=1 and “yea”=0 (roll
calls #341, #125, #149, #201).
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analysis. The panel specification means that I am combining roll-call votes within
and across congressional sessions, which allows for a simple and compact analysis
of the data. I estimate probit models with robust standard errors clustered by
legislator, to deal with across-observation relationships in the error term. I include
roll-call fixed effects to control for any unmodeled heterogeneity across votes and
differences in the yea-nay margin over time.
Table 4 presents results related to my first two arguments. Hypothesis 1 is that
legislators with more left-wing ideologies will be more likely to support IMF
funding increases. I evaluate this argument using the first dimension of a legislator’s
DW-NOMINATE score as a proxy for “ideology.” DW-NOMINATE estimates range
from −1 to +1 (from most left-wing to most right-wing) and are available for all
legislators in my sample of IMF financing roll-call votes (1945–2009). Given how
closely the Poole-Rosenthal scores are related to political partisanship, I estimate the
effect of DW-NOMINATE separately for each party. I also control for
PRESIDENT’S PARTY, which is a binary variable equal to 1 if the legislator is a
member of the same political party as the current president. I include this control
because ideology may correlate with being of the same party as the president, which
would predispose legislators to support the IMF if presidents exert executive
influence on co-partisans (presidents have uniformly supported IMF funding bills
when they come before Congress).
In Models 4.1 and 4.2, the negative and highly significant estimates for DW-
NOMINATE suggest that right-wing legislators are more likely to oppose financing
the IMF than left-wing legislators. This holds for both Democrats (Model 4.1) and
Republicans (Model 4.2), even taking into account whether a legislator is a member
of the same political party as the president. Sharing the president’s party affiliation





















































































Fig. 3 Ideology of the house and senate, 1945–2008. Notes: The figure graphs the mean value of the first
dimension DW-NOMINATE score by chamber. DW-NOMINATE scores are widely used measures of
legislators’ ideological locations over time. Scores range from −1 to 1, with higher values denoting a more
right-wing ideology. See Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
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money for the IMF when they belong to the same party as the president, but personal
ideology affects voting behavior independent of this relationship.14
To test Hypothesis 2, that legislators from the upper house are more supportive of the
IMF, Models 4.3 and 4.4 adds the binary variable, SENATE, to the regressions. The
coefficient estimate is positive and highly significant for both Democrats (Model 4.3)
and Republicans (Model 4.4), controlling for individual ideology and party ties to the
president. Model 4.5 pools Democrats and Republicans and includes roll-call vote fixed
effects (not shown) to deal with unmodeled heterogeneity across votes and over time.
The estimates for DW-NOMINATE and SENATE remain highly statistically significant
(z=−23.13, z=6.20 respectively) in the proper direction.
Figure 4 provides a substantive interpretation of these probit results and a sense of
the magnitude of the effects. I simulated the predicted probability of observing a vote in
favor of increasing the IMF’s resources, and then examined how the predicted
probabilities change as the explanatory variables increase one standard deviation from
their means, holding other variables at their mean values (binary variables are set to
zero).15 I estimate these effects for members of each party using Model 4.3 and Model
4.4. The impact of ideology is substantively large and very precisely estimated for
both Democrats and Republicans: a one standard deviation increase in DW-
NOMINATE above the party mean—a move to the right—reduces the likelihood of
a Democratic legislator supporting the IMF by 24 percentage points. A similar move
reduces the chance that a Republican legislator will support the IMF by 31 percentage
points. The effect of being in the Senate is also large: a Democratic senator is 10
percentage points more likely than a Democratic representative to support the IMF,
and a Republican senator is 17 percentage points more likely than a Republican
representative to support the IMF. These effects are large, even in comparison with the
effect of being in the same party as the president. Sharing the party affiliation of the
president increases the likelihood of voting more funds to the IMF by 13 percentage
points for Democrats and 5 percentage points for Republicans.
To further explore Hypothesis 2, I take advantage of a “natural experiment”
derived from apportionment procedures that give certain senators and representatives
identically sized and equally heterogeneous constituencies.16 Due to their small
populations, some states are apportioned only one legislator to the lower house and
these “representatives-at-large” are elected by the entire state.17 Since senators from
these small states are elected by the same constituency, a comparison of the votes
cast on the IMF by representatives-at-large and senators from the same states allows
for a direct test of the argument that members of the Senate are more pro-IMF than
members of the House due to their larger constituencies. If it is the size of
constituencies that matters, then voting by representatives-at-large and senators from
the same states should be similar, controlling for legislators’ personal characteristics,
14 As DW-NOMINATE is constructed solely from roll call data, it incorporates both member beliefs and
the ideological positions of constituents that elect members into Congress. See Fleck and Kilby (2002).
15 The simulations were performed with the “Clarify” software developed by Tomz et al. (1998).
16 See Karol (2007) for an application of this experiment to trade policy voting.
17 The number of states with a representative-at-large has changed over time due to population and
migration shifts. For the votes in my sample, the states with a single representative include Alaska (1959–
2009), Delaware (1945–2009), Hawaii (1959), Montana (1991–2009), Nevada (1945–1978), North
Dakota (1970–2009), South Dakota (1980–2009), Vermont (1945–2009), and Wyoming (1945–2009).
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Table 3 Roll-call votes on IMF financing in the U.S. congress, 1944–2009
Chamber Bill or amendment Congress Vote date Roll-
call
Result
House H.R. 3314 to provide for the participation





Senate To pass H.R. 3314 and provide for U.S.




House H.R. 4452 to amend the Bretton Woods
Agreements Act, changing the amount





Senate To pass H.R. 4452 and increase the U.S.




House H.R. 10162 Provides standby authority





House H.R. 6497 to authorize an increase





House H.R. 18306 to increase appropriations





House H.R. 13955 authorizing changes





House H.R. 9214 authorizing the U.S. to participate






Senate To pass H.R. 9214 on Witteven and the IMF 95th July 31,
1978
#907 69-16
House H.R. 7244 authorizing an increase in





Senate S. 2271 authorizing an increase in




House H.Amdt. 341 to amend H.R. 2957 to strike
the language that increases U.S. participation
in the IMF General Arrangements to Borrow
from $2 billion to $4.25 billion, and authorizes
the Secretary to consent to an increase of






Senate SAmdt. 1320 to amend S. 695 to make the
increase in the U.S. quota in the Fund
and the increased participation of the
U.S. in the General Arrangements to
Borrow effective only through the fiscal




Senate S.Amdt. 835 to amend S. 1435 to strike
additional U.S. contributions to the IMF




House Motion to allow the House and Senate to
pass identical spending bills, providing
the IMF with $18 billion for quota increase







since they have identical constituencies. But if there is some unmodeled reason other
than constituency size that accounts for why senators support the IMF more than
Representatives, then voting by senators and representatives-at-large will be
significantly different.
Table 5 presents the results of this experiment. Model 6.1 is the baseline model.
Model 6.2 adds REP-AT-LARGE and SENATE * REP-AT-LARGE, the interaction of
the Senate dummy and the binary variable indicating whether a member is from a state
with only one representative. The interaction term picks up the cases where senators and
representatives have exactly the same constituencies—it is a formal test of the hypothesis
that constituency size explains the Senate-House gap in support for the IMF. Notice that
the SENATE point estimate is virtually identical across Models 6.1 and 6.2 while the
estimate for the interaction term SENATE * REP-AT-LARGE is not significantly
different than zero.18 This means we cannot reject Hypothesis 2: the Senate-House gap
in support for the IMF is the same for representatives-at-large and other cases, ceteris
paribus. Put another way, legislators serving in the Senate are no more pro-IMF than
legislators in the House when they have identical constituencies.
Model 6.3 moves away from the experiment to assess whether senators’ length of
tenure affects their voting behavior. Controlling for tenure length is important because
senators may be more supportive of the IMF because they serve longer terms than
representatives, rather than because they have larger constituencies. I assess this
alternative institutional argument via variation among senators with respect to TIME TO
ELECTION. This variable measures the number of years between an IMF roll-call vote
and a senator’s next election. It ranges from 0 to 5, with 0 indicating that a senator is up
for reelection later in the same year as the roll-call vote, and 5 indicates that the senator
has 5 years remaining until her next election.19 The evidence from Model 6.3 supports
the “larger constituency” hypothesis: the point estimate for TIME TO ELECTION is
18 Interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models is not straightforward. For example, the direction
and significance of the effect may be different for different observations (Ai and Norton 2003). Using the
inteff command in STATA, I calculated the interaction effect correctly (Norton et al. 2004). This revealed
that the interaction term SENATE * REP-AT-LARGE is not statistically significant at any level but
positive for all observations.
19 Senators are divided into three classes for purposes of elections and every 2 years the members of one
class—approximately one-third of the Senate—face election or reelection. Data on the class and election
dates of senators are from Swift et al., Database of Congressional Historical Statistics.
Table 3 (continued)
Chamber Bill or amendment Congress Vote date Roll-
call
Result
Senate S.Amdt. 2100 to S. 1768 to provide supplemental




Senate S.Amdt. 1138 to H.R. 2346 (Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009) to strike the
provisions relating to increased funding




Bill and vote information obtained from the “Voteview” and the Library of Congress “Thomas” websites
The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009 357
positive but not statistically significant. For senators, the length of time between
elections is not statistically related to voting on the IMF, which supports the hypothesis
that the Senate-House difference in support for the IMF is due to constituency
differences.
Overall, the inference is that constituency differences are the root cause of the
pro-IMF bias in the Senate. In states where representatives and senators share the
same constituency, they tend to vote similarly on IMF funding. In all other states,
senators have larger and more diverse constituencies than representatives and are
more supportive of the IMF because of the difference in constituency size.
My third hypothesis is that representatives are more susceptible than senators
to interest group and constituency pressures. I argue that the IMF tends to
provoke two types of societal pressures that bear especially on representatives
(due to their smaller districts): pressures from groups that are harmed or
benefited from globalization—which the IMF promotes—and pressures and
rewards from money center banks that gain directly from IMF activities. I proxy
legislator affinity to money center banks by the amount of campaign
contributions members receive from these banks. To identify money center
banks, I use the regulatory classification in the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council’s (FFIEC) “Country Exposure Lending Survey.” Because
the FFIEC identifies the specific banks that comprise the money center group, I
was able to obtain a list on which to base the collection of campaign contribution
data (see the Data Appendix for the banks that make up this group). For campaign
contributions, I use the Federal Election Commission’s data on contributions from
Political Action Committees (PACs). My constructed variable is BANK CON-
TRIBUTIONS: the sum total of money center bank contributions to each legislator
Table 4 Roll-call voting on IMF funding increases, 1944–2009
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5)
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans All
DW-NOMINATE −3.288 −4.547 −3.274 −4.708 −2.529
(0.247)*** (0.305)*** (0.247)*** (0.322)*** (0.109)***
President’s Party 0.521 0.117 0.523 0.112 0.387
(0.058)*** (0.061)* (0.058)*** (0.062)* (0.044)***
Senate 0.362 0.429 1.102
(0.134)*** (0.109)*** (0.178)***
Constant −0.171 1.291 −0.215 1.264 −0.129
(0.072)** (0.107)*** (0.075)*** (0.109)*** (0.081)
Vote fixed effects No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.198 0.223 0.203 0.232 0.322
Number of groups 1189 910 1189 910 2100
Observations 2661 1796 2661 1796 4458
Probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group (legislator) in parentheses. The omitted
roll-call vote in Model 5 is S1945. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in the previous electoral cycle. The value of contributions is divided by 1,000 for
ease of interpretation.
I also expect representatives to be sensitive to the indirect effects of globalization on
their districts: the larger the share of voters in a district that benefit (lose) from global
economic integration, the more likely a member will be to support (oppose) the IMF.
The winners (losers) can be defined by industry, following Ricardo-Viner reasoning, or
by skill level following Stolper-Samuelson. Either operationalization captures my
argument that legislators understand that the IMF promotes globalization, and take
positions that reflect the impact of globalization on the real incomes of their constituents.
My proxies for the Ricardo-Viner effect are NET IMPORTS and NET
EXPORTS. NET IMPORTS is the percentage of district workers employed in
manufacturing industries where the ratio of imports to consumption is greater
that the ratio of revenues from exports to total industry revenue. NET EXPORTS
is the percentage of workers in sectors where the ratio of revenues from exports
to total industry revenue is greater than the ratio of imports to consumption (see
the Data Appendix for more details). To tap agricultural trade, I use AG
PRODUCTION, which is the total value of agricultural output (crops and
livestock) by district/state.20 Legislators from districts with higher agricultural
Fig. 4 Substantive effects of legislator ideology, chamber, and political party on support for the IMF.
Notes: Values represent the change in the predicted probability of voting in favor of IMF funding as each
variable of interest is increased by one standard deviation over its mean, holding other variables at their
means (binary variables Senate and President’s Party are held at zero). Estimates are from Models 4.3 and
4.4. The whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals
20 I thank Dustin Tingley and Helen Milner for these agricultural data, which they constructed from county-
level U.S. Department of Agriculture data. See Milner and Tingley (2010).
The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009 359
output should be more supportive of the IMF since those districts are likely to be
net exporters of farm products. To model Stolper-Samuelson effects, in which I
posit a positive relationship between constituent skill levels and legislator support
for the IFIs, I use HIGH SKILLS, which is the share of state or district population
aged 16 and above employed in executive, administrative, managerial, and
professional specialty occupations. However, since high skills might correlate
with wealth or education which could lead constituents to favor the IMF, I include
a control of district/state household MEDIAN INCOME.
Due to data availability limitations, I can only test these pressure group models
back to 1980 for the House and 1991 for the Senate. Table 6 presents estimates with
votes pooled by chamber. The results largely confirm the inference that
representatives will be more susceptible to interest group and constituency pressures
than senators. In Model 7.1 (House votes) and Model 7.3 (Senate votes), I do not
control for DW-NOMINATE and PRESIDENT’S PARTY. This is because member
ideology and party affiliation are, to some extent, indirect reflections of constituency
interests: voters elect legislators whose ideology and political party suggest they will
vote in accordance with constituents’ interests (Fleck and Kilby 2002; Fordham and
McKeown 2003). To the extent that legislator ideology and partisanship influence
voting in a way that is not determined by constituency interests via elections, those
elements of DW-NOMINATE and PRESIDENT’S PARTY are uncorrelated with
Table 5 “Natural experiment” comparison of senators and representatives-at-large with identical constituencies
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3)
Senators Only
DW-Nominate −2.203 −2.202 −1.982
(0.093)*** (0.093)*** (0.234)***






Senate * Rep-At-Large 0.083
(0.344)
Time to Election 0.040
(0.034)
Constant 0.326 0.327 0.576
(0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.128)***
Vote Fixed Effects No No No
Pseudo R2 0.221 0.221 0.222
Number of Groups 2100 2100 386
Observations 4458 4458 693
Probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group (legislator) in parentheses. Including vote
fixed effects (not shown) does not substantively alter these results. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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constituency interests and omitting them won’t cause omitted variable bias.21 The
coefficients on my other constituency variables will thus reflect the full influence of
constituents: both electing and lobbying legislators. Nevertheless, in Models 7.2 and
7.4, I include DW-NOMINATE and PRESIDENT’S PARTY as controls for
comparison. In these models, the direct (lobbying) and indirect (electing) channels
through which constituents influence legislator voting are included, but it is
impossible to attribute indirect influence properly.
Comparing across Models 7.1 and 7.3 provides evidence that the House and
Senate differ in terms of sensitivity to societal pressures. In Model 7.1 (House
votes), all constituency and special interest coefficients are statistically significant
and correctly signed, with the exception of AG PRODUCTION, which is significant
but negatively signed. Farm interests should support the IMF since a large share of
the agricultural land in the United States is devoted to grain production for export
markets and the IMF’s mission is to promote trade. The negative estimate may be
due to the fact that AG PRODUCTION is correlated with legislator ideology:
farming regions in the U.S. tend to elect legislators. Indeed, in Model 7.2, which
controls for ideology with DW-NOMINATE, the sign flips and AG PRODUCTION
is positively signed, as expected, and significant.
All other point estimates in Model 7.1 support Hypothesis 3. Receiving more
campaign contributions from money center banks (BANK CONTRIBUTIONS), and
having more skilled workers a district (SKILLS), correlate positively and
significantly with a House member voting in support of the IMF.22 Members
representing districts with larger shares of workers employed in import industries
(NET IMPORTS) are less likely to vote new funding for the IMF, while members
with more workers in net export industries (NET EXPORTS) are more likely to
support the IMF.23 As a group, the first five (constituency) variables in Model 7.1
are jointly significant at the 0.0001 level. Model 7.2, which controls for legislator
ideology and partisanship, does little to alter the inference that voting in the House
on the IMF is correlated with constituent characteristics and interest group pressures.
The joint significance of the five constituency variables in Model 2 is very highly
significant (P=0.0000). By contrast, none of these coefficient estimates are
significant, either independently or jointly, in Model 7.3 or Model 7.4, which pool
votes from the Senate. While House members are sensitive to constituency
influences, senators appear to be insulated from these forces.
As a final test, I consider whether heterogeneity within states bears on IMF
voting in the Senate.24 Bailey and Brady (1998) argue that constituent pressures
are more likely to influence the votes of senators when states are relatively
homogenous in terms of voter preferences. The intuition is that homogeneity of
voter preferences simplifies legislators’ electoral coalition-building problem
sufficiently that they take positions on salient issues that are responsive to voter
21 I thank Christopher Kilby for this suggestion.
22 This does not necessarily indicate that bank contributions cause members to change their votes. The
positive correlation might simply mean that banks give money to representatives that share their policy
views.
23 Testing both Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo Viner effects in the same model may not be technically
correct (Imai and Tingley 2011; Ladewig 2006), but I do so here to ease comparison with previous work.
24 I thank a reviewer for suggesting this test.
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preferences. By contrast, when voter preferences within a state are heterogeneous,
senators are less responsive to constituents and more apt to vote on the basis of
ideology and party-specific coalitions. Since this is a very different mechanism
than the one I posit, I need to confirm that the Senate is less responsive to
constituency interests due to senators’ larger districts. To do so, I re-estimate
Model 7.5 on a sample restricted to the 25 states that Bailey and Brady (1998)
Table 6 Constituency and special interest group influences, by chamber











Bank contributions 0.017 0.037 −0.004 0.005 −0.005
(0.009)** (0.010)*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Skill level 1.097 2.239 2.278 0.398 23.191
(0.631)* (0.742)*** (3.245) (3.083) (14.857)
Net imports −0.975 0.241 −1.837 −1.766 0.042
(0.555)* (0.669) (2.289) (2.608) (4.688)
Net exports 2.997 3.547 −3.040 −6.450 −7.634
(1.145)*** (1.736)** (4.919) (4.889) (9.373)
Ag production −21.188 11.439 −8.762 −20.645 −26.552
(6.816)*** (6.038)* (13.647) (12.926) (24.063)
Median income −0.001 0.026 0.056 0.017 −0.070
(0.008) (0.009)*** (0.024)** (0.024) (0.051)
H1983 −0.075 −0.087 – – –
(0.113) (0.136) – – –
H1998 −0.327 −0.540 – – –
(0.261) (0.307)* – – –
DW-Nominate – −2.643 – −1.875 −3.360
– (0.160)*** – (0.400)*** (0.908)***
President’s Party – 0.452 – 0.421 1.142
– (0.084)*** – (0.259) (0.677)*
S1998 – – 1.103 1.257 1.629
– – (0.287)*** (0.431)*** (0.884)*
S2009 – – −0.089 0.207 1.005
– – (0.221) (0.252) (0.755)
Constant −0.055 −1.649 −1.741 0.138 −2.266
(0.273) (0.320)*** (1.037)* (1.112) (3.529)
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.351 0.103 0.315 0.419
Number of groups 836 836 191 190 92
Observations 1150 1150 289 288 126
Probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group (legislator) in parentheses. The omitted category
in Model 7.2 is H1980. The omitted category in Models 7.4 and 7.5 is S1991. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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determine to be homogenous.25 As none of the constituency and interest group
point estimates are statistically significant in this sample, we can reject the
alternative hypothesis that the mechanism insulating senators from constituency
pressures is the underlying homogeneity of states.
Figure 5 plots the substantive effects of constituency and interest group effects by
chamber from Models 7.1 and 7.3. For the House, my estimates suggest that a one
standard deviation increase in BANK CONTRIBUTIONS above its mean increases
the likelihood that a representative will support the IMF by 4 percentage points.26
The same effect holds for House members when SKILL LEVEL and NET
EXPORTS are increased by a standard deviation, but the later is more precisely
estimated. Increasing the share of House district employment in the NET IMPORT
sector reduces the likelihood that a representative will support the IMF by 3
percentage points. But in the Senate, the effects of changing BANK CONTRIBU-
TIONS, SKILL LEVEL, NET EXPORTS, and NET IMPORTS are never
statistically different than zero. Overall, representatives appear to be more responsive
to constituent interests and pressure group lobbying than senators.
5 Conclusion
When Congress ratified United States participation in the IMF in 1944, it retained
permanent authority over increases in U.S. financial commitments to this
international organization. I have analyzed roll-call voting on IMF funding increases
as if it is a historical record of “support” for the IMF within the United States. I
found that support for the IMF is generally higher in the Senate than in the House
due to differences in electoral rules between the chambers. Large districts—as
opposed to long tenures—appear to make the Senate the more “internationalist”
chamber on IMF policy and insulate senators from constituent and interest group
pressures. I also found that ideology is an important source of congressional voting
decisions on the IMF, with right-leaning legislators more likely to vote against new
IMF funding than left-wing legislators. While politicians on the right tend to view
the IMF as a profligate bureaucracy that distorts incentives in international financial
markets, left-wing legislators view the IMF more favorably because they think
international financial markets are prone to crises and need a crisis manager.27
25 Bailey and Brady (1998) construct an index of state heterogeneity from six social, economic, and
religious variables: education, income, occupation, housing ownership, ethnic stock, and religion. Using
this index, they rank states from the most to the least heterogeneous: NY, NJ, MA, CA, CT, HI, RI, IL,
LA, FL, NM, PA, WI, NH, TX, VT, ND, AZ, MD, MI, MN, DE, NV, OH, CO, ME, WA, NE, MO, AK,
SD, MT, OR, IA, KS, VA, IN, WY, KY, GA, ID, UT, OK, MS, AL, SC, TN, WV, NC, AR. The 25 states
ranked below Colorado are coded as “homogeneous.”
26 Endogeneity is a concern here as banks may give contributions to representatives that already share
their policy positions rather than to “buy their votes.” However, Broz (2008) performs a difference-in-
difference test to establish that causality runs from bank contributions to IMF voting, as opposed to the
other way around.
27 To quote right-wing conservative Newt Gingrich, the 1998 IMF quota increase was “typical liberal
foreign policy…we’re not turning over $18 billion to a French Socialist [Michel Camdessus] to throw it
away.” Camdessus was Managing Director of the IMF at the time. Speech before the Christian Coalition,
September 18, 1998, Washington, DC. Cited in the New York Times, September 25, 1998.
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An implication of both findings is that an aggregate shift to the right in U.S.
politics poses significant problems for the IMF and its supporters, especially in the
House of Representatives. Since the early 1990s, the House has moved substantially
to the right and this has led IMF supporters to innovate strategies to secure approval
of new funding. One strategy has been to package IMF funding with other spending
projects that right-wing legislators are loathe to oppose (Babb 2009). But there are
limits to the effectiveness of this approach: opponents on the right can try to build
majorities for amendments to strip the IMF allocation from these engineered bills.
They can also call the bluff and vote against the strategically constructed bill, albeit
at a cost.
A case in point occurred when President Obama was trying to get approval for the
$100 billion line of credit to the IMF to meet the commitment he made at the April
2009 meeting of the G20. Supporters in the Senate attached the IMF money to a
supplemental war spending bill after the House had already passed its war spending
bill without IMF funds. Since normal procedure is for the two chambers to reconcile
their differences and present an identical bill, the plan was to conjoin IMF funding
with “funding the troops” so that right-wing House members would be more inclined
to support it.
The strategy faced its first hurdle when House Republicans, who had supplied
168 votes for the war spending in the House, said they would vote against the war
supplemental en masse unless the IMF money was put to a separate vote. But the
joint IMF-war supplemental bill moved forward after the Senate voted overwhelming
against an amendment to strike the IMF allocation; as I have shown, the Senate is a safe
haven for the IMF. As the bill moved forward, the White House and the Democratic
leadership, lead by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), went into high gear
Fig. 5 Substantive effects of constituency pressures in the house and senate. Notes: Values represent the
change in the predicted probability of voting in favor of IMF funding as each variable of interest is
increased by one standard deviation over its mean, holding other variables at their means (or zero for
binary variables). Estimates are from Model 7.1 (House) and Model 7.3 (Senate). The whiskers indicate
95% confidence intervals
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threatening and offering deals to 51 anti-war Democrats that had opposed the war funds
the first time around. The pressure worked and the bill squeaked through by a
vote of 226–208, with 32 Democrats joining all but five Republicans in voting
no. Throughout the drama, there were serious doubts that the strategy would
work (Allen 2009).
It is no surprise that the House is the locus of anti-IMF sentiment in the United
States. I have shown that institutional factors help explain why IMF support varies
by chamber, with the Senate substantially more supportive than the House. Due to
their large, state-wide constituencies, senators are more apt to support the IMF’s
“internationalism,” even as increasing globalization brings dislocations to some
workers and industries and benefits to others.
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medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Data Appendix
AG PRODUCTION: Market value of agricultural products (livestock and crops)
taken from county level data collected by the 1978, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 and
2002 Census of Agriculture. Converted into 2000 constant dollars and divided by
10,000. Source: Milner and Tingley (2010).
BANK PAC: Campaign contributions from money center bank political action
committees to candidates in the previous electoral cycle, divided by 1,000
(contemporaneous 1979–80 data were used HR 7244). Money center banks are
identified by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Country
Exposure Lending Survey (various years). In the 1979–80 cycle, the FFIEC list
includes Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, Citicorp, Continental
Illinois, First Chicago, Manufacturers Hanover, and J.P. Morgan & Co. In the 1981–
82 cycle, BankAmerica Corp joins the list. By the 1996–97 cycle, consolidations and
takeovers reduced the list of money center banks to Bank of America, Bankers
Trust, Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, First Chicago, and J. P. Morgan & Co). In the
2007–08 cycle, the banks were Bank of America, Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase,
U.S. Bancorp, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. Contributions from these banks’
political action committee to candidates are from the Federal Election
Commission.
DW-NOMINATE: The first dimension of the DW-Nominate score, capturing a
member’s ideological position on government intervention in the economy. DW-
Nominate estimates the position of each legislator, using roll call voting and scaling
techniques. Scores range from −1 to 1, with higher values denoting a more right-
wing ideology. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997).
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS: Denotes whether a major international financial
crisis occurred during the year of the roll-call vote, where 1=crisis, 0 no crisis.
Crisis roll calls are: #341 (H1983), #125 (S1983), #737 (H1998), #342 (H1998),
and #201 (S2009).
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MEDIAN INCOME: Median district household income, divided by 1,000.
Source: Adler, E. Scott. “Congressional District Data File, [congressional term].”
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
NET EXPORTS: Percent district population aged 16 years and over employed
in net export industries. Net export industries are two-digit SIC manufacturing
sectors where the ratio of revenues from exports to total industry revenue is
greater than the ratio of imports to consumption. These ratios are provided by
Campa and Goldberg (1997) for three time periods: 1975, 1985, 1995. I used the
sample closest to each vote to assemble the data. In 1975, net export industries
were Tobacco 21, Textiles 22, Lumber 24, Printing 27, Chemicals 28, Fabricated
metals 34, Industrial machinery 35, Electronic equipment 36, Transportation
equipment 37, and Instruments 38. In 1985, net export industries were Tobacco 21,
Chemicals 28, Industrial machinery 35, and Instruments 38. In 1995, net export
industries were Food 20, Tobacco 21, Printing 27, Chemicals 28, and Instruments
38. The source for sectoral employment is the County Business Patterns, Bureau of
the Census. County-level employment data was aggregated up to the congres-
sional district level using the following procedure: If a county contains more than
one congressional district within its borders, the number of workers from an
industry who are in each district is estimated by using the fraction of the
county’s population residing in each district. For example, if 10% of a county’s
population lives in a district, that district receives 10 percent of the county’s
workers in each industry. I obtained the geographic information from the
MABLE ‘98/Geocorr v3.0 Geographic Correspondence Engine [http://plue.sedac.
ciesin.org/plue/geocorr].
NET IMPORTS: Percent district population aged 16 years and over employed in
net import industries. Net import industries are two-digit SIC manufacturing sectors
where the ratio of imports to consumption is greater than the ratio of revenues from
exports to total industry revenue. These ratios are provided by Campa and Goldberg
(1997) for three time periods 1975, 1985, 1995. I used the sample closest to each
vote. In 1975, net import industries were Food 20, Apparel 23, Furniture 25,
Petroleum 29, Rubber 30, Leather 31, Primary metals 33, and Other manufacturing
39. In 1985, net import industries were Food 20, Textiles 22, Apparel 23, Lumber
24, Furniture 25, Paper 26, Petroleum 29, Rubber 30, Leather 31, Stone, Clay and
Glass 32, Primary metals 33, Fabricated metals 34, Electronic goods 36,
Transportation equipment 37, and Other manufacturing 39. In 1995, net import
industries were Textiles 22, Apparel 23, Lumber 24, Furniture 25, Paper 26,
Petroleum 29, Rubber 30, Leather 31, Stone, Clay and Glass 32, Primary metals 33,
Fabricated metals 34, Industrial Machinery 35, Electronic goods 36, Transportation
equipment 37, Instruments 38, and Other manufacturing 39. Sectoral employment is
from County Business Patterns, Bureau of the Census. See “Net Imports” for the
concordance procedure.
PRESIDENT’S PARTY: Denotes whether a member is of the same political party
as the current president, where, 1=same party, 0 otherwise.
TIME TO ELECTION: Denotes the number of years between an IMF roll-call
vote and a legislator’s next election. For senators, this variable ranges from 0 to 5,
with 0 indicating that the Senator is up for reelection later in the same year as the
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roll-call vote, and 5 indicating that the Senator was has 5 years remaining until his/
her next election.
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